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INTRODUCTION 
The 200-year plus history of the U.S. Navy is a proud story of battles fought and won, of 
outstanding leaders afloat and ashore, and of selfless service to our Nation. 
Equally important, it is a story of the continuing application of new technology to the 
advancement of Naval capabilities. From smoothbore guns to submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, from sextants to satellite navigation, from sail to steam to nuclear 
propulsion, the Navy's progress has been measured by the introduction of technological 
in novat ion. 
Perhaps at no other period in this history has the adoption of new technology in the Navy 
been as pronounced and effective as during the Cold War throughout the fifty or so years 
following the end of World War II. This technology led, for example, to strategic 
submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, an entire family of air-launched 
weapons, and, more recently, the AEGIS system. The difficulties encountered in 
developing these systems were formidable, and the conceptual, technological, and 
engineering advances necessary to bring them to fruition were remarkable, even by 
today's standards. Safe, reliable nuclear propulsion for submarines; long-range missiles 
launched into exo-atmospheric trajectories from beneath the surface of the seas; missiles 
fired from high-speed aircraft, with the self-contained capability to home in on other high- 
speed aircraft; shipboard weapon control systems simultaneously detecting, tracking, and 
coordinating hundreds of airborne targets. None of these would have been thought 
possible a generation ago. With respect to the research, development, and introduction of 
weapons and combat systems, this was the most productive period in Navy history. 
Why was the Navy able to make such advances? What were the circumstances that led 
to such remarkable achievements? How were the resources of the Navy brought to bear 
on the operational and technical problems of the day? These questions deserve to be 
examined, in order that an historical picture of the Navy's experiences be captured and 
recorded. 
One way to assess any aspect of Navy history is to seek out those were a part of that 
history and to solicit their views and experiences. This approach represents the basis for 
the present report. 
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BACKGROUND 
The Naval Postgraduate School identified a group of individuals who, during the period of 
interest, had key roles in the development of technology and in its application to Naval 
capabilities. They were carefully selected both individually and collectively, i.e. each had 
had substantial duties in a particular area of expertise, and together they represented a 
wide range of responsibilities across both the spectrum of research, development, 
engineering, and system acquisition as well as within the Naval community. They are 
listed below, along with their major affiliations pertinent to the time period being examined. 
(More complete biographies for each of these individuals are shown in the Appendix.) 
Dr. Alan Berman (Director, Naval Research Laboratory) 
Dr. James E. Colvard (Technical Director, Naval Surface Warfare 
Dr. Phil DePoy (President, Center for Naval Analyses) 
VADM James H. Doyle Jr., USN(ret) (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Mr. Ralph E. Hawes (General Manager, Pomona Division/General Dynamics) 
Dr. Alexander Kossiakoff (Director, Johns Hopkins University Applied 
Dr. Walter LaBerge (Technical Director, Naval Weapons CentedChina Lake) 
VADM Paul F. McCarthy, USN(ret) (Director, RDT&E, Office of the CNO) 




The group encompassed the entire process from ideation and discovery through putting a 
combatant to sea; thus the Labs/R&D Centers, OPNAV sponsors, SYSCOM program 
managers, fleet operations analysis organizations, and private industry were included. 
All of these individuals expressed an interest in the subject and a willingness to meet 
together for discussions of their respective experiences and contributions. (Dr. Kossiakoff 
participated in the discussions via teleconferencing.) 
The object of this meeting was to record the personal views of some of the people who 
played key roles in the systems development and acquisition process during the time 
period in question. They were a collection of officers and civilians who managed the 
programs and directed the institutions that produced these systems. There is no record of 
such a group having been previously assembled for this purpose. 
In advance of the meeting, which was held on 12 and 13 June 2001 at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, each participant was provided with some explanatory material, 
topics for discussion, and questions to address. Participants were asked to focus on what 
they did and why they did it during their years of having accountable responsibility in the 
R&D and acquisition process. Their views of what worked and what didn't was to be 
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considered particularly important. Comparisons of their experiences with today's 
environment were to be avoided, as this should be left to future historians. 





Questions posed to stimulate the thinking of the participants included: 
What were the key things that allowed your organization to be successful? 
Who were the key players you dealt with; whom did you try to avoid? 
What competition did you face? 
What obstacles did you have to overcome? 
What institutions helped you the most and which hindered you the most? 
Where did you go for help? 
What irritated you the most and what elated you the most? 
Who did you consider the honest brokers in your arena? 
Were there conflicts between institutional leaders and program leaders? 
How much time did you spend seeking resources? 
The meeting started with each participant individually describing his experiences in the 
R&D and acquisition world as he was involved in it. These individual presentations then 
formed the basis for a subsequent roundtable discussion among all the participants to 
determine whether common themes and threads could be discerned from the earlier 
presentations. The intent was to have a freewheeling discussion among a group of 
people who were key players during the Navy's most active period of combat systems 
acquisition in order that this experience could be captured for its historical value. The 
sessions were videotaped and transcribed; the transcription served as the basis for 
following two sections of the present report. (A complete transcription is available from 




This report includes extracts from the full transcription in two major areas. These are 
‘keys to success’ and ‘combat and weapon system examples. ’ This report is not a 
substitute for the full transcription but is intended to serve those readers who do not have 
the time or need to read the entire proceedings of the symposium. In order to relay the 
actual thoughts of the participants, not an interpretation of their thinking, this report is 
comprised of grouped direct quotations appropriate to the two topics cited above. ‘Keys to 
success’ were mentioned by every participant; the more critical points are assembled into 
this portion of the report, which deals with a variety of issues such as the importance of 
technical competence and teamwork among the institutional players. 
The ‘examples’ section discusses large combat systems, with AEGIS being the example, 
and weapon systems, with SIDEWINDER as the example. While these two programs had 
many similarities, they also reflect a major transition that occurred during the Cold War 
era. SIDEWINDER was an in-house driven development of a combat subsystem. AEGIS 
represents a Program Manager-driven system developed by a team of in-house and 
industry institutions. AEGIS is a complete combat system and was the first major 
‘systems engineered’ product of the Navy. Discussion of these examples reflects the 
‘keys to success’ points in actual programs of the era. There was unanimity of opinion 
among the symposium participants that both AEGIS and SIDEWINDER were examples of 
very successful programs. 
Keys to Success 
. 
Technical Competence. The existence of technically trained people at all levels of the 
officer corps, government civilians, and industry employees was considered a seminal 
characteristic of the success of the period. RADM Meyer, who was the first Program 
Manager and is known as the “founding father” of AEGIS, told of his education: 
“I don’t view myself as a scientist, by any means. As a matter of fact, I like to think 
I’m an engineer, but that’s really pushing. I’ve never, ever literally gone into 
industry and worked on a bench. Much of my education came from right here at 
the Postgraduate School. And it was a very fortuitous education. I would not be 
what I was without it and the incredible professors and officers who guided me and 
caused me to study, in particular, fire control.” 
Mr. Hawes, discussing his experience in industry: 
“During my ten years as General Manager, I never had a Program Manager who 
was not a technically-trained man. Why? Very simple! Technical people make 
better technical decisions on programs than somebody out of a financial community 
or somebody that came out of a marketing community or whatever else makes up a 
large business enterprise.” 
Dr. Kossiakoff contrasted the Cold War era with the present situation: 
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“The decline of the technical officer Navy is another great, complicated issue, 
particularly in the technological warfare that we find ourselves in today.” 
Continuity. In the discussions of the key factors for the success of development and 
acquisition programs, continuity of leadership and the relationships among organizations 
were considered to be among the most important. The AEGIS program was cited as one 
that benefited from relatively long tenure of key managers. Among the members of that 
team who were participants in this symposium: 
VADM Doyle served as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare from 
1975 until 1980, and was instrumental in obtaining funding and providing “top cover” for 
the AEGIS program. 
RADM Meyer was the Manager, AEGIS Weapon System, in the Naval Ordnance 
Systems Command from 1970 to 1972. From 1975 until 1983, he served as the founding 
Program Manager, AEGIS Shipbuilding. 
0 Dr. Kossiakoff was Technical Director of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 
Laboratory from 1969 until 1980. APL was responsible for the integration and testing of 
AEGIS. 
0 Mr. Hawes was Vice President of the Pomona Division of General Dynamics (the 
builder of the Standard Missile for AEGIS) from 1973 until 1977. He served as the Vice 
President and General Manager of the Division from 1977 to 1988. 
0 Dr. Berman was the Technical Director of the Naval Research Laboratory (that 
developed much of the radar technology used in AEGIS) from 1967 until 1982. 
0 Dr. Colvard was the Technical Director of the Naval Surface Weapons Center, 
Dahlgren, from 1973 until 1980. NSWC was responsible for the development of the 
training systems and computer program certification and support for AEGIS. 
VADM Doyle stated: 
“What helped me most was tenure. I was there for five years, so there was 
continuity. And I saw a lot of people come and go, particularly at the political level, 
and I outlasted a lot of people. So that was to some advantage.” 
Mr. Hawes commented: 
“I can’t stress how important [tenure] is.. ..If you had a four-year engineering 
development period, it would be nice to have your program manager there for that 
four years. If you had an eight-year production phase, it would be nice to have your 
program manager there for the eight years, but we could handle four. So that 
hooking of the tenure of the program manager to the phase of the program for 
continuity is very, very important.” 
Dr. Berman discussed the development of SOSUS, which also benefited from long tenure 
of the project manager: 
“And above all, it [the success of SOSUS] was a function of having one man, Joe 
Kelley, who ran the project from the time he was an 0-3 until he was an 0-6, 
roughly twenty years later. One man drove the entire project for the entire time! 
There was continuity!” 
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. The participants emphasized that a prime key to 
success was to have a simple organization with clearly understood roles and missions. 
Once a decision was made, it was critical to the execution process that people had the 
appropriate authority and were willing to use it. Mr. Hawes discussed his experience 
at General Dynamics with the AEGIS program: 
“During my tenure also, particularly in the early years, the agency roles, the labs, 
field organizations, program officers -- they had clearly-defined roles and generally 
lived within them. And APL had an awful lot to do with setting [those roles] in the 
early phases. And we didn’t have, until the later years, very much conflict between 
what we were all about [and] what the other agencies were all about.” 
RADM Meyer, discussing the Navy structure during the early years of the AEGIS program: 
‘ I . .  .The relative straightfowardness or simplicity of the organizational structure that 
existed in the Navy started in Washington, D.C., and radiated downward.” 
VADM Doyle, discussing the structure of the Office of the CNO: 
“So again, there was the simplicity of the organization that allowed me to go directly. 
to the CNO, not through anybody else, with a tasker to task me to do a study on 
what the destroyer should be.” 
Dr. Colvard, responding to Dr. Berman: 
“There were simpler organizations and more direct lines of communication and the 
speed with which decisions got made.” 
Dr. DePoy, discussing the early days of the POLARIS program: 
“...the difference, it seemed to me, was that OPNAV and all the [other] decision 
maker staffs were much smaller ..... The guy who made most of the decisions on 
POLARIS in OPNAV was a Commander -- who later got passed over for Captain.” 
TEAMWORK. Given clarity of the command lines and the operational authority, 
developing complementary and mutually supporting relations among the organizations 
was the most critical challenge to Navy program leadership. Again, RADM Meyer, 
reacting to Dr. LaBerge’s analogy of a technical leader as an orchestra leader: 
“So, now, the challenge of leadership is the very thing you just said. None of these 
people work for you. So you’re confronted with a challenge of getting the 
laboratories, civilians, the production lines, the factories, study groups, everybody 
to play in this grand symphony in this orchestra, and playing for just for more than 
thirty seconds. That is a bona fide leadership challenge. So effective project 
management starts with that. Starts with that! The fundamentals of leadership! 
Certainly, you know, conductors have to master that or, in fact, they don’t last very 
long. They can be temperamental and misbehave, but in the end if they [can’t 
accomplish that], they’re gone!” 
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VADM Doyle stated: 
“So we started what I think was a textbook illustration of a team effort between 
OPNAV and PMS-400 and the Applied Physics Laboratory and other laboratories 
and contractors trying to get AEGIS to sea.” 
Dr. Colvard commented on the change in the environment: 
“The point .... is to suggest that there was a time when the institutions tended to 
cooperate more with each other and not necessarily compete with each other, to 
steal the work and that sort of stuff. These are examples of the reality of that 
cooperation. It has become less possible to do that. As the competitive 
environment has changed, institutions are now out trying to get into each other’s 
pockets in order to stay alive.” 
Dr. Kossiakoff, discussing the SMS program: 
“And we were really a team with both the contractors that were supporting the 
equipment and the Naval officers that ran the ships. And Eli Reich was a tough 
taskmaster, but he did a pretty incredible job. And, of course, Wayne [Meyer] grew 
up in that environment.” 
DISCRETIONARY FUNDS. The participants felt that one of the key factors for success 
was the availability of discretionary funds (6.1, 6.2, 6.2A) in the Navy and IR&D funds in 
industry. The availability of these funds was the key to examining future technologies in 
order to avoid technological surprise. Investment had to be made before the threat was 
fully defined or the technology was fully matured, hence could not come from program 
sponsors. Dr. Colvard said: 
“You’ve got real challenges in any process, but certainly in the R&D process. 
When the problems are only understandable by the person who possesses esoteric 
knowledge and experience, how do you generate those people? How do you stay 
technically capable to go out to industry and know that you’re going to get what you 
asked for, and that what they propose is reasonable? 
“YOU can never contract out the ability to understand the military problem in the 
technical terms or to know who could solve it, or to recognize a correct solution 
when you get it. To do that, you must have technically competent people who are 
continuously available to you, who cannot go out of business because they’re not 
making enough money. Whose only motivation is to tell you what they believe to 
be right, and they have to know a high percentage of the time what the laws of 
physics will permit. To generate that talent, you have to invest. Quite often the 
payoff isn’t realized until the long-term. 
“.......and when you have no institutional funding, who pays for that investment? 
The Program Manager doesn’t want to. He’s got to get his product out the door, 
meet his schedule, meet his dollar cost. 
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“...so the idea of putting investment money into an institution that allows it to 
generate the knowledgeable people began to go away and everything is now 
measured down to the fraction of the penny, and overhead becomes the major 
driver. When we had modified Naval Industrial Funding, you had a certain amount 
of institutional investment. You went away from that, then you had a certain 
amount of independent R&D funding that the technical director had control of.” 
Dr. Berman: 
“There was also essentially some institutional funding, the extreme case being 
NRL, but most of the NAVMAT labs did have what amounted to institutional 
funding. It was not as big as it should have been, but it did exist. With the possible 
exception of NRL, most of that has gone away. For instance, even at a little place 
like CNA, they used to have a pot of money. Now, every single individual’s time 
has got to be assigned to a project, down to the tenth of an hour. I think it’s a point 
of stupidity, but that’s the way it is.” 
VADM McCarthy: 
“We did have flexibility in the industry community with IR&D, which is important and 
which industry really needs. Hugh Montgomery was clever enough, during my tour . 
at OP-098, to bring on the 6.3A type of structure that with a tittle bit of money, about 
ten to fifteen million dollars a year, we could select a few ideas that we could go out 
and experiment with. But where you are today, it’s tough to do that sort of thing.” 
Dr. LaBerge: 
“You know, another fundamental thing that has happened is that DARPA has 
essentially taken over the institutional funding. If you look at where the free money 
is, that goes on new ideas as opposed to detailed engineering of existing stuff, 
almost all of it is in DARPA. And so DARPA sets what the priorities are. The Navy 
doesn’t feel that there’s anything lost by going to [DARPA] and getting the money, 
but that doesn’t mean that [DARPA] does what the Navy really wants.” 
PRIORITY AND SENSE OF URGENCY. Throughout the symposium, it was recognized 
by all the participants that the era being discussed was a time when defense programs 
were given a higher priority than is now the case. Hence, it was much easier to obtain the 
resources, both financial and human capital, than it would otherwise have been. It was 
also easier to accelerate the decision-making process. RADM Meyer pointed out that 
AEGIS had the advantage of being developed at a time when the cruise missile threat was 
considered to be a national priority: 
“I enlisted in the Navy on the 12th day of May in 1943. Only a year and a half or so 
later the nation was horrified because the Germans had attacked with what was 
popularly referred to as a ‘buzz bomb,’ the V-1 rocket with a pulsejet engine in it. 
And subsequently with the V-2 rocket attacking all of England and London and 
such with the threat that Peenemunde was working on the A-4 rocket which would 
be used to assault New York City and other big cities in the east. 
8 
“But then in October 1945 at the Battle of Leyte Gulf was one of those defining 
events, which you all have alluded to earlier this morning, and that was when 
something occurred that the Occidental world simply couldn’t deal with. And it was 
a divine wind, or it came to be called a Kamikaze. The Occidental just could not 
adjust his thinking to believe that were men who would strap themselves to a bomb 
and, in the name of their emperor, literally commit suicide by diving into a ship. 
“And we knew not how to deal with that. We just didn’t know how to deal with it, 
except to bring every weapon to bear that we knew. We emerged from those years 
finally to Okinawa in April 1945, the longest and the most decimating battle that 
ever occurred in Naval history. More officers, more men, more ships, more 
airplanes lost than ever. And it left an indelible mark on our Navy. 
‘Well, what happened in the case of these weapons, these three, the two I 
mentioned in Germany and the Kamikaze? We somehow could understand the 
German ones because there was no man strapped to it. But we couldn’t grasp 
what was happening in the Pacific. I get very upset when I find people rewriting 
history, particularly concerning the use of the atomic bomb. I think that President 
Truman made an extraordinary decision of the need to do so. So what really 
happened is, the war ended. We never overcame them. The war ended. That’s 
how we solved that problem. 
“So when I look at my life as it flowed from being commissioned in the reserve 
Navy, transferring to the regular Navy and sailing around the world in sundry ships 
in those years, part of the occupation forces, part of several wars which had 
occurred throughout that era, my whole life has really, really been driven. Not by 
my choice, particularly, but it’s almost as though God had a destiny for me, when I 
thought about it in later years, by the cruise missile or the Kamikaze. So you can 
define almost everything that I have integrated up or led or done as being driven by 
that compulsion, which all of you here at this table had a role in, in one dimension 
or another, some in much longer periods than others. That’s what drove my life. 
“And I listen to this extraordinary recitation by Jim Doyle, a short summation, one of 
which I‘ve never heard him say it as well before. There was that really short era, 
half a decade or so, that did change the world. And it did change the Navy. And it 
changed it irreversibly, and each of you has alluded to it when your turn came.” 
Mr. Hawes, the Vice President and General Manager of the plant that produced the 
Standard Missile for the AEGIS system, commented from his viewpoint: 
“My first point is the challenge of missilery. 1 came onboard [the Pomona Division 
of the General Dynamics Corporation] in 1956, which was about four years after it 
was born. I think 1952 was kind of the birth year. And I stayed until about three 
years before the death of the organization. So I wasn’t quite at the birth, but also 
wasn’t quite at the death. I look at it that I was really at the golden years of that 
particular division. 
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“So missilery was something new. It attracted the youngest and brightest 
and most eager of the engineers that were really still coming out of the era of the GI 
Bill and World War II. It attracted large numbers of very bright people, most of 
whom, by the way, had a service background, or many of them did. 
“They had an experience base that many of the young engineers coming out of 
the academic community do not have today. And that created a very different 
environment with the young engineers who were going into an organization like the 
Pomona Division. 
“My second point is there was a national priority on defense systems. What 
we were doing was important, nationally. It wasn’t so much about business 
or money, because a lot of us down in the organization knew that we were 
doing something of national importance. Of course, a lot of that was 
driven by the fact that we had a more coherent threat at that time called 
the Russian Bear.” 
EXAMPLES 
WEAPON SYSTEM: SIDEWINDER. From 1951 to 1957, Walt LaBerge served as 
Project Manager for the SIDEWINDER program at China Lake. His description of the 
early days of the program follows: 
“Looking back with fifty years of perspective, the early days at NOTS were really 
very creative. Usually that’s the result of good senior management. At China Lake, 
it was almost all Dr. Bill McLean’s doing. However, Bill McLean, who was TD 
[Technical Director] while I was there, was there only because of those who 
preceded him and promoted him. 
“When NOTS first opened, Dr. Charles Lauritsen had brought with him the 
professional ethics, work standards, and the freedom for creativity that was imbued 
in him at Cal Tech. For my money, without Bill McLean and Lauritsen’s Cal Tech 
standards, the place wouldn’t have been nearly as good as it was. And for many 
years after Lauritsen went back to Cal Tech, Charlie was asked to stay involved 
with the station’s progress as a member of the station’s Advisory Board. 
“For me, that was the first over-riding lesson I took from my SIDEWINDER 
experience; namely, organizations rapidly take on the character of their bosses, 
and if you want an organization to be honest, energetic, and creative, you must get 
an honest, energetic, and creative person to run it. A second important lesson 1 
took was that quality oversight through Boards almost always is a great asset. 
“To properly understand SIDEWINDER, you need to remember that in those times 
missilery was very new and there was no book on which to base one’s designs. 
Creativity was essential, but had to be a special kind of creativity. It was a 
10 
creativity where a new state-of-the-art had to be built upon bits and pieces of the 
world as it then existed. Old though it may be, SIDEWINDER may also be a 
harbinger of the future. 
“That was the kind of thing the Navy needed and China Lake was good at in those 
olden days. Curiously, though, it is also the situation today. Today, new technology 
abounds everywhere and the trick is how to blend and meld old and new and to get 
to the marketplace quickly with something that outperforms your opponent’s 
products. SIDEWINDER did that for the Navy. SIDEWINDER was just an idea in 
1950, was operational by the mid-fifties, and is still in the fleet today. 
“To give you some appreciation for the solid engineering creativity of those days I’d 
like to explain what SIDEWINDER really was. The fundamental design problem of 
SIDEWINDER was to build a simple but accurate transonic and supersonic missile 
out of the only seven available vacuum tube types that could meet the acceleration 
and vibration environments of air-to-air missile flight. Those existing tubes had all 
come out of the artillery influence fuses developed during WWII. As well, the early 
China Lake crew also had a bunch of rocket parts and warheads in the various 
lockers around the station left over from unguided rocket developments at the end 
of WWII. 
“The China Lake design question was: ‘How, from the technology then available, 
could a reliable and affordable guided missile system be designed that could really 
help Navy pilots flying jet fighter aircraft in combat for the first time?’ Those pilots 
engaged in combat in Korea had found that jet-against-jet combat was substantially 
different from all previous air-to-air combat. Pilots found that their early jet engines 
used gas so fast that they no longer close on their jet fighter opponents to machine 
gun range without running out of gas. 
“It turned out that there were three necessary ingredients that made SIDEWINDER 
successful in this new era of guided missile technology. They were; firstly, the Navy 
had a clear problem that urgently needed a solution. Secondly, that China Lake had 
an unusually creative leader who knew both the mission environment and the 
technology available. And thirdly, because the Navy gave China Lake enough time 
to work out and test SIDEWINDER’S components before they scheduled it into 
production. 
“The latter ingredient, allowing the necessary time to do and test the SIDEWINDER 
components, was a bit of an accident. Then, the Navy in Washington felt that it 
already had an air-to-air missile and didn’t see why it needed another. However, 
Washington didn’t mind its lab at China Lake doing R&D and testing on advanced 
missile components. Of course, the only way to demonstrate these components 
was to put them all together and hit targets, which NOTS did. That really is how the 
Navy got a missile it originally didn’t want but eventually made more of than the 
sum of all it ever officially wanted. 
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“BuAir had started the SPARROW missile several years earlier. It used radar 
guidance and had to put up with guidance errors caused by unpredictable 
scintillation in signal direction during missile flight. As a result it had a big warhead 
to cover anticipated miss distances and therefore was quite heavy. This restricted 
the number of missiles small fighters could carry. 
“The question that Bill chose for his China Lake design team was: ‘How can we at 
NOTS provide a much lighter missile to small fighters like F9F‘s and F86’s that can 
be carried in numbers so as to sustain combat support to the bombers they were 
escorting ?’ 
“The common theme through the many SIDEWINDER examples that follow is that 
when the state-of-the-art in any technology doesn’t let you do what you need to do, 
don’t struggle with an unsolvable problem but, rather, find a way to design around 
the problem. Find some easier, simpler, and therefore more reliable way to do what 
you want. 
“The SIDEWINDER airframe was picked in the following way. McLean challenged 
us by saying: ‘We don’t know much yet in this country about transonic and 
supersonic aerodynamics and anyway BuAir won’t give us time in a wind tunnel, so 
our airframe had better be pretty simple.’ Essentially, we started off knowing that 
we were going to have to build a miniature supersonic airframe that had to be 
more-or-less independent of aerodynamics, simple, and straightforward. 
Aerodynamics had not been the pacing item of our missile. In the beginning we 
even had square wings in front and back. This demand for this lack of aerodynamic 
subtlety drove our Chief Aerodynamicist, Lee Jagiello, wild -- saying that he was 
embarrassed among his peers at his society meetings. This was the next life-time 
principle that I learned from SIDEWINDER; to the greatest possible degree keep 
things simple and don’t invent things you don’t have to. 
“At McLean’s insistence, we went to a canard airframe, a virtual feathered arrow 
with lots of stability in the back and small canard wings up in the front for 
maneuvering. In that kind of an airframe, shifts in Center of Pressure and Center of 
Gravity due to changing speeds, attitude, and burnout don’t make much difference. 
Unfortunately however, when one buys into a canard airframe, one buys into a 
known big problem. Namely, when you wiggle the front wings, the resulting 
downwash runs over the back wings and makes the airframe try to roll. This means 
that when you command, ‘go here,’ you actually end up going some other direction. 
How that downwash problem was fixed demonstrated great ingenuity. 
“McLean posed this known problem to his staff one day and solicited all their 
opinions on the best way to fix it, no matter their position on the local organization 
chart. The winning idea in came in fact from one of his lathe operators. 
“That idea, then (and still) unique in the missile world, was cultural simplicity itself. 
That idea was to let the airstream do all the work and to do it without requiring any 
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measurements or computations. It was simply to put control tabs at the rear outside 
corners of each of the missile’s four rear wings. Inside each control tab was 
inserted a flat wheel, pivoted in the middle of the tab and spun by the airstream 
around it. 
“This wheel became a gyroscope and when spun up, any tendency of the wing to 
roll precessed the tab gyro in the direction to force the tab to move into the 
airstream in the direction needed to stop the roll. That early 1950’s design concept 
can still be seen at the turn of the 21 st century on every operational SIDEWINDER 
in the world. 
“The rest of the SIDEWINDER design issues had similarly creative solutions. 
Among those questions was: How in the world do you take an airframe that 
continuously wiggles back and forth and unscramble where it is going from where it 
is instantly pointing? And after that you do that, how do you make it go where you 
want it to go when it almost never is going where it’s pointed, and do all that with 
the leftover vacuum tubes of WW!!? 
“After some collective head scratching, McLean opted for an optical telescope gyro . 
stabilized in space to free the gyro from motions of missile that carried it. The result 
was a spinning Cassagrain telescope gyro firmly attached to a large magnet. Both 
were to be spun about their center of mass and connected to a central ball bearing 
supported by the missile body. The spin, as well as precession of the free gyro, 
was provided by coils in the missile’s outer body. In this way, we eliminated lots of 
feedback computations otherwise needed. Again, it was McLean’s insistence on 
doing complicated things the easiest way possible. 
“As far as making SIDEWINDER go where you want, his design also was an 
original one. The problem in missile servos has always been that the servo has to 
be connected to the missile body. Therefore, usually you have to know at all times 
where the body is pointed in order to know how far to stick out the control wings. 
This forces one not only to move the control surfaces about responding to what the 
target is doing, but also to make necessary compensation for the missile’s angle of 
attack with the airstream as it pulled ‘g’s . Keeping track of a lot of variables at one 
time normally is a complicated process. 
“So McLean decided to skip all that and to produce torque directly, saying: ‘Let’s 
design our servo to command torque directly on the control surfaces instead of 
wing position as airplanes do. If we can do that, it will make SIDEWINDER 
independent of how its unsophisticated airframe wiggles about.’ And so that’s how 
we designed the servo that’s still around today, fifty years later. 
“The moral of all these examples as I see it is this: the China Lake Lab, in those 
days, was set so as to encourage creativity, simplicity, and responsiveness to Navy 
operational needs. It was allowed to define and be responsible for developing for 
BuAir its air-launched weapon designs. It did so in a truly spectacular way because 
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this China Lake environment encouraged very good people to come, to stay, to 
become a part of the Navy family, and to feel productive. And that system worked. 
More SIDEWINDER’S (about 250,000) have been purchased and flown by more 
countries and more combat kills recorded than by any other air-to-air missile. 
“This China Lake environment of the ‘old days’ produced not only SIDEWINDER, 
but has also given the Navy a large number of other air-launched weapons came 
from this creative environment, to name but a few; SHRIKE, HARM, and 
WALLEYE. And then things changed, and things don’t work that way anymore. 
“DOD became convinced that industry could do better than its labs and set up a 
system where the Navy and the other Services became managers of the doers who 
were to be all in industry. Sometimes it worked out well, as did AEGIS. But for the 
most part I don’t believe it has served the Navy well. And I suspect that things are 
getting worse than better. Over the years I have seen hands-on leadership 
becoming management from afar. That in turn has led to a plethora of management 
‘busy-work‘ that is almost always diverting from the solution of crucial program 
issues. Managers now have to pay more attention to binding contractual 
requirements, monthly reports, PERT charts, budget forecasts, OT&E reports and 
Milestone deadlines and the like than the pressing technical issues of their 
programs. 
“There seems no longer time nor any patience for creativity of the kind 
demonstrated in the development of SIDEWINDER. Such creativity as does exist 
finds its way more frequently into Power Point charts than into mission-oriented 
hardware. 
“As a result I believe that the DOD and the Navy now do everything the hard way 
and for that most often get very complicated, over-designed, very costly weapons 
that take forever to get to the fleet. From my perspective, the ‘good old days’ 
actually were as good as remembered.” 
COMBAT SYSTEM: AEGIS. VADM Doyle, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Surface Warfare, discussed the early stages of the AEGIS program: 
“Well, getting back to priorities, it seems to me in looking over the various priorities 
and trying to keep everything in balance, that it was very important to get the 
AEGIS system to sea as soon as possible. So that became my number one 
priority. So we started what I think was a textbook illustration of a team effort 
between OpNav and PMS-400 and the Applied Physics Laboratory and other 
laboratories and contractors trying to get AEGIS to sea. 
“Of course, we had several aborted attempts. And Admiral Meyer, I’m sure, will 
give us more detail. But there was the LONG BEACH possibility. There was a 
possibility, which the CNO had recommended, that we build eight CGN strike 
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cruisers and sixteen DOG-47s. And we had a problem with Title 8 and Admiral 
Rickover insisting that all ships be nuclear powered. I think it was 1977, there 
were no warships in the budget because of a failure to come to agreement between 
the House and the Senate on that. Finally, we got that turned around and got 
agreement that the TICONDEROGA, the CG-47, would be authorized and 
appropriated. 
“.....You know, we talk about transformation these days. And the real 
transformation in acquisition took place under Admiral Meyer‘s dynamic leadership. 
I mean, this was a transformation in organization, acquisition, fleet introduction, 
shore-based training and infrastructure, land-based prototype, engineering support, 
manning and billet structure, and new concepts of ship integration and system 
engineering. You know, as he puts it, there was an evolution of some 20 years of 
build a little, test a little. 
“And so that was really a transformation that just revolutionized the way we 
introduced surface ships. Rather than just having the situation where the hull, 
mechanical, and electrical people were the designers who would design the ship, 
and the shipbuilder would build the ship, and all of a sudden one day at the pier, 
here comes the delivery of the combat systems to be put aboard, and you hoped to 
hell it would work. And so that transformation was done. 
“Now, this didn’t come about easily. A lot of blood and sweat went with it. I 
remember particularly there was a year there -- there may have been more - but 
for about a year the there was a DDG-47 manager, PMS-389, and there was an 
AEGIS PMS-403, and nothing was happening. So Admiral Meyer and I both 
approached the Chief of Naval Material. 
“Here’s a good point: that we had a Chief of Naval Material that we could go to. 
And he authorized a study, or directed a study, to be made by a flag officer. Ed Ott, 
I believe, did that study and reported back that, ‘Hey, you’ve got to combine. 
You’ve got to create ?PMS-400. We’ve got to get on with it. You’ve got to integrate 
the combat systems and the ship.’ 
“It was obvious that we needed to keep the AEGIS line going, not only the 
TICONDEROGA class, but also we needed a new destroyer. So again, there was 
the simplicity of the organization that allowed me to go directly to the CNO, not 
through anybody else, with a tasker to task me to do a study on what the destroyer 
should be. The words in the tasker were ‘Battle Group capable.’ That was the 
criterion: Battle Group capable. 
“So we formed the study. Admiral Meyer supplied Admiral Roane, I believe, at that 
time. And my people and a number of lab people were involved, and they went off 
to White Oak for a year and did the study and came back. And they compared all 
the various systems in AAW particularly against what we had and said, ‘Well, it’s 
got to have AEGIS aboard; AEGIS based on AEGIS technology.’ 
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‘We also made a pitch in the study, in the analysis, to use TOMAHAWK. Actually, 
we played TOMAHAWK in the analysis, and, interestingly, we used it in the initial 
phases of some scenario. I have forgotten what it was, Vladivostok or wherever, 
but we programmed the TOMAHAWK in the study against the air defense sites. 
And we proved, on paper, that if you did that, the follow-on aircraft strikes would 
suffer less attrition. 
“Of course, when we got that resolved we got all sorts of skeptics. PA&E didn’t 
believe that at all. And so forth and so on. In any event, we reported out the study 
to the CNO. And I was told, initially, that, ‘We’re not going to build AEGIS. We’re 
never going to build AEGIS. We’re not going to build an AEGIS destroyer. They’re 
too expensive. They’re too vulnerable,’ et cetera, et cetera. ‘Over my dead body 
will we build it.’ Well, fortunately, nobody had to die, and in the ensuing fray we 
persevered and our successors persevered. And now how many AEGIS ships are 
in commission?” 
RADM Meyer: 
“There are fifty-eight now in commission; twenty-seven cruisers and thirty- 
one destroyers. And about ten years’ worth of ships are on the building ways right 
now.” 
RADM Meyer discussed some of the details of the program: 
“ ..... fast-forward to the first AEGIS, which had some 22 cabinets in a signal 
processor. And had moving target indication, MTI, as a requirement in it. And 
there was continuing argument, fussing, fighting, almost on a national basis on how 
many coefficients of the equation could you get into that design. 
“And, of course, RCA, one of the greatest outfits ever raised, even exceeding 
Sperry, perhaps, in its grand design, was on a schedule and being measured. The 
Applied Physics Laboratory kept fussing around, interfering. Other laboratories 
were fussing round, interfering, saying, ‘Well, that ain’t the right design. That ain’t 
the right design. Let’s do this. Let’s do this.’ 
“I said, enough of this. We’re going to freeze MTI as the RCA design is, knowing 
that it is not adequate. And we’re going to return MTI to the laboratory and send it 
back to APL and set up a joint structure and everything to, in fact, go do the 
necessary research and the necessary experimentation to overcome the flaws that 
existed in the MTI. 
“I recall we sent NORTON SOUND on a long cruise up into the Bay of Alaska; its 
sole assignment was to gather data. And she gathered some six million data points 
on the MTI design, and proofed it. And ultimately it entered into the production 
AEGIS system. 
16 
‘Well, the single processor went from room-sized down to twenty-two cabinets and 
then to eleven, when it came out of NORTON SOUND, then in the engineering 
development model up at CSEDS to eight cabinets. Then the next maturity was 
four cabinets. I believe today it’s two cabinets. Of course, these two cabinets 
today, no one would dare try to carry them because they ain’t carriable. They’re 
really packed to a fare-thee-well. But it taught how important, not only tenure, but 
evolution is. Alan [Berman] mentioned earlier, that occasionally something 
momentous disrupts evolution and how important that is. 
“ .... I want to say something about the Advanced Surface Missile System. It’s one 
of the obstacles in the way. Recall for a minute the momentous events of 1967. 
The Egyptian sinking of the Israeli destroyer was one of those momentous events. 
And in December of 1969 under the aegis, so to speak, of DCP-16, it was 
described as the Advanced Surface Missile System, twenty pages long. And it is, 
by the way, the governing document today, thirty years later, still the governing 
document AEGIS design. 
“But at the last minute it was determined that the ASMS missile was too expensive. 
One of the difficulties was McNamara’s geniuses and the newly created heroes 
which continue to be sustained, called ‘systems analysis’ had determined that the 
Navy had no need for a surface-to-air missile more than fifty miles in range. That 
was the most the Navy needed. 
“So the missile was determined to be too expensive. And two weeks before 
Christmas it was determined to strike the missile out of the development. Captain 
Lou J. Stecker happened to be the aide to John Foster when they were sitting late 
at night arguing on this. And Lou Stecker picked up his pencil and wrote a phrase 
in there, which said: ‘The missile shall be Standard Missile with midcourse 
guidance.’ Just a phrase! That is what was written in. Closed the deal! Christmas 
week the contract was let to RCA Corporation. Not one nickel was laid out for the 
missile. There was no program any place for the missile, and no one had the 
foggiest idea what ’standard missile with midcourse guidance’ meant. 
“But it was one of those little teensy things that changed the whole course of 
history. And the irony of this thing was that the contract was awarded to RCA 
because the Navy felt so strongly about trying to get a fixed-array radar, and 
viewed RCA as the strongest. And they were teamed with Raytheon and, 
therefore, it was overwhelming. Bendix was on that team. And with the missile 
being struck, Bendix disappeared. General Dynamics/Pomona, was on the losing 
team. And there was sadness all during Christmas in Pomona because the mighty 
Casey had struck out. And yet look how it was reborn, totally reborn, in another 
whole manner. 
“That one little phrase and one leader! I learned a couple things through those 
years that I believe have enduring significance. One is, you have to work with what 
you’ve got, until, as you said, some momentous thing occurs. You’ve got to work 
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with what you’ve got, not with what you want to wish would be. My personal view is 
that this is a fundamental flaw right now in the DD-21 effort. You have to work with 
what you’ve got. 
“Number two, tactical dimensions are significant and important. And all of you at 
this table in your lifetime have been through crises that occurred with tactical 
dimensions, particularly in air-to-air weapons. And recall the infamous Liz Begg’s 
investigation where she was sent to look into the panoply of weapons we had of 
various dimensions and how to fit them in our airplanes. So what drove AEGIS to 
where it is, is Standard Missile’s thirteen-and-a-half inches. And if you couldn’t get 
it in that thirteen-and-a-half inches, you weren’t going to get it. So necessity drove 
the engineering. It’s what kept the PHOENIX missile out and later in life the 
PATRIOT missile, because their dimensions didn’t meet the tactical structures, 
logistically, that we had to work in. And I think that that is an important lesson. 
“I mentioned tenure and work with what you got. Rickover taught me, really, a 
couple of significant things in my life. One is very well known, and that is: the devil 
is in the details. That was one of his favorite expressions, meaning that 
engineering is detail, detail, detail, detail, detail, not generalities. 
“But he had another one that you don’t very often see. He said, ‘You must make all 
decisions as though you’re going to live forever.’ That is to say, you have to be 
prepared to live with the decision, meaning you can’t make expedient decisions no 
matter what the cost. You must try to make the right one. Well, it doesn’t follow 
that you do, but the matter of the code, to me, seems very significant in trying to 
deal in large programs. 
“I want to make up another story in ‘The Naked City.’ It had to do with a point that 
Jim Doyle made. When we started out in this design, there were no screens at all 
in the design. Even though there were specialized consoles, Bill Goodwin and I 
drove them out of the system, to get to the Navy standards, UYA-4, which sailors 
all knew how to use already, which was very significant in my mind. And since it 
was, in essence, a destroyer design, it had no flagship requirements. 
‘Well, of course that evolved in a few months: we need a unit commander’s 
requirements, so we need a screen. And by the way, we want independent 
facilities for the unit commander. So we want him in a room that’s totally isolated 
from the CIC so he does not contaminate the system. You can understand that. 
Build a glass. He can look through the glass, and he could act as unit commander. 
Well, of course, that didn’t last very long. 
“I want to talk about tenure and the significance of interchange because Admiral 
Doyle wasn’t the first OP-03 that I dealt with by any means, as you full well 
appreciate. I had some really free spirits there; for example, Frank Price, Roho 
Adamson, just to name a couple. 
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“Jim Doyle again, one of those momentous things, or defining moments as 
ComThirdFleet, laid down in TACNOTES the warfare-commander concept, which 
has prevailed to this day until the reformers are starting to disassemble it, and that 
formed the basis for CIC design. And then we had to do something about flag 
design. And so he wanted screens. Well, here was a risk situation because there, 
in fact, were no projectors available that could provide those screens with high 
reliability. 
“And that’s when we embarked on the liquid-crystal projector with a scientist out at 
Hughes-Fullerton. And it turned out to be a high risk, and in some respects even 
today is a little iffy sometimes in its operation. But that liquid crystal is what 
pioneered these screens into our ships, even though there are any number of 
people on the benches who would say: ‘That’s not modern.’ ‘You’re not keeping 
up.’ ‘We’ve got all this touchscreen stuff coming along.’ But none of it met the rigor 
needed in shipboard application in reliability and maintenance and so forth. I 
thought that was a very significant, important thing that occurred. So where four 
screens finally emerged, and these, in fact, became significant flagships within our 
Navy, because of the four large-screen displays. 
“In this program, there was an obstacle that hardly anyone thinks of anymore, and it 
was Vietnam. In the anti-Vietnam attitude, which emerged in our nation, RCA 
virtually tried to deny that AEGIS existed. In fact, the RCA Corporation printed two 
annual reports in a row that failed to mention AEGIS in any way, shape or form. 
And what finally blew my head off was when Bill Goodwin, my friend, associate, 
and also the AEGIS manager, had to make a periodic report to 30 Rockefeller 
Center one day. And he got over there and they told him, ‘Look. One Elvis 
Presley record brings more income to this company than you’re bringing. And 
that’s where you stand.’ And I’ve never forgotten that little incident, that there at 30 
Rock we were in the category of an Elvis Presley record. 
‘Well, it kept getting a little worse. So one day Jim [Doyle] said, ‘We got to do 
something about this.’ So we got on our body armor and got together our slides. 
And he and I took off and assaulted 30 Rockefeller Center, the CEO of the 
corporation. And we came out of there unscathed, but we also came out with a 
whole different attitude and a reversal of the behavior of corporate for the AEGIS 
program. 
“Just two officers going and talking about the seriousness and the necessity of it for 
the country. And that CEO, he didn’t like it, but he bit the bullet. And even though 
he was anti-Vietnam and even though we didn’t equate to an Elvis Presley record, 
we turned it around. I don’t think either one of us could have done it alone. And I 
don’t think we could have done it without significant dedication and passion with 
which we attacked it. 
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SYNOPSIS OF PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS 
The foregoing report presents excerpts from the individual presentations. The following is 
a review of the significant points from the presentations and discussions about which there 
seemed to be general agreement. Support for each point was not unanimous among the 
group, and attribution is not assigned to issues presented. 
Continuity was a major point in all the discussions. This included continuity of 
leadership, funding, and focus on the problem being solved or the capability being 
developed. 
Technical competence, appropriate to the requirements of the role, was viewed as 
critical at all levels. This was true for Naval officers, the civil service and University labs, 
as well as industry. 
0 The existence of discretionary funds, in the form of IR&D or B&P in both industry and 
the government was viewed as critical to the advancement of new technology during the 
Cold War era. 
Clarity of role among private and public sector institutions and between the policy and 
execution components of institutions enhanced trust and facilitated strong positive 
interrelationships. 
Program managers who were successful had rather similar characteristics. They were 
extremely focused, they knew the technical details of their program, and were, in effect, 
their own chief engineers. They developed loyal dedicated contractors, they did not 
tolerate fools gladly, they remained in the same assignment for many years, they 
maintained a stable funding flow, and they were persuasive in their presentations. 
There probably never were any "good old days," and no matter what we think, 
the current acquisitions system is very unlikely to revert to the way we did business thirty 
or forty years ago. 
In all successful programs and institutions there was an emphasis on results rather than 
cost, mutual trust and respect, and a sense of urgency backed up by the courage of 
convictions. 
The existence of a defined potential enemy created a rather stable funding environment, 
which reduced the amount of infighting and institutional competition. It may have also 
contributed to the perceived higher tolerance for failure of that time. 
There was strong uniformed leadership, with rank aligned with responsibility, for those 
officers who dealt with the OSD and Congress. This was important in the provision of 
"high cover" for major programs. 
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The approach to building AEGIS cruisers and destroyers effected an historical 
transformation in organization, fleet introduction, shore-based training and infrastructure, 
land-based prototypes, engineering, manning and billet structure, and new concepts of 
ship integration and systems engineering. This was due to the tenacity and tenure of both 
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare and the AEGIS Program 
Manager. 
The in-house laboratories played an important role as honest brokers and keepers of 
the technical safety net. Industry worked well with most of the laboratories, but was at 
times uncomfortable with others. Industry was frustrated by the perceived lack of ability to 
hold an in-house laboratory accountable. 
The best leaders, in both industry and government, were those who were rotated 
through both experiential and educational assignments such that they developed an 
understanding of the Navy and industry from a corporate sense. 
There was an emphasis on objective rather than process. 
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of Chicago 
Center for Naval Analyses 1959-1 992 






1 965- 1 967 
1964-1 965 
1 963- 1 964 
1961 -1 963 
1960-1 961 
Distinguished Senior Fellow 
President and CEO 
Executive Vice President and Director of Research (Acting 
Vice President, CNA and Director, Operations Evaluation 
Director, Systems Evaluation Group 
Field representative to Commander Sixth Fleet 
Director, S.E. Asia Combat Analysis Division 
Field representative to Commander Seventh Fleet 
Field representative to Commander Task Force 77 
Analyst, Naval Warfare Analysis Group 
Field representative to Air Development Squadron 5 
President) 
Group) 
Other Professional Affiliations: 
Member, U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 1983-1 987 
Vice Chairman, U.S. Army Science Board, 1978-1 981 
Chairman, U.S. Army Summer Study on Statistical Techniques in Testing, 1980 
U.S. Representative to NATO Systems Science Panel, 1976-1 979 
Chairman, NATO Systems Science Panel, 1978 
Chairman, Board of Investigation on Safety of Production at Radford 
Member, OT&E Subpanel of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1969 
Ammunition Depot, 1978 
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Honors and Memberships: 
Defense Distinguished Public Service Award (1 990) 
Navy Distinguished Public Service Award (1 989) 
Air Force Meritorious Civilian Service Award (1 987) 
Army Outstanding Civilian Service Medal (1 981) 
Member, CNA Board of Trustees (1 990-present) 
Member, NORC Board of Trustees (1 999-present) 
Member, Applied Physics Laboratory, U. of Washington, Advisory 
Trustee and Member, N. American Wildlife Park Foundation Board of Advisors 
Member, Nichols Research Corporation Board of Directors (1 994-1 999) 
Member, Kapos Associates, Inc. Board of Directors (1 994-1 999) 
Member, Visiting Committee, Graduate School of Public Policy, U. of 
Member, Council on Foreign Relations (1 999-present) 
Board (1 991 -present) 
(1 991 -present) 
Chicago (1 996-present) 
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Vice Admiral James Henry Doyle, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired) 
James Henry Doyle, Jr. was born March 27,1925 in Medford, Massachusetts to 
Lieutenant junior grade (later Vice Admiral) and Mrs. James H. Doyle (both deceased). He 
attended grammar and high school in San Diego, the Philippines, Norfolk, Honolulu, and 
Berkeley, California. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1946 (Class of 1947) and 
from George Washington University Law School in 1953 with the degree of Juris Doctor 
with distinction under the Navy postgraduate program. 
As a junior officer, he served in USS CHICAGO (CA-136) and USS JOHN W. 
THOMASON (DD-760). He was Executive Officer of USS BULWARK (MSO-425), USS 
JOHN S. McCAlN (DL-3), and USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA-148). He commanded USS 
RUFF (AMS-54), USS REDSTART (MSF-378), and USS JOHN R. CRAIG (DD-885). 
Following instruction in nuclear propulsion in 1965, he took command of the nuclear 
powered, guided missile cruiser USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN-25), a four year tour including 
three deployments to the Seventh Fleet during the Vietnam War, and the ship's first 
refueling . 
Ashore, he served in the International Law Division of the Judge Advocate General, as 
Aide and Flag Lieutenant to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and in the 
Programming and Planning Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 
As a flag officer, Admiral Doyle was Chief, International Negotiations Division, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, involved in SALT 1 and Incidents at Sea negotiations with the Soviet Union, and 
represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the U. S. Delegation to the Law of the Sea 
Conference. He commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWELVE and deployed to the Sixth 
Fleet as Commander Attack Carrier Striking Group TWO embarked in USS FORRESTAL 
(CV-59). His last sea assignment was Commander Third Fleet from 1974 to 1975. 
From 1975 to 1980, he wasthe Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare, with 
responsibility for the Navy's shipbuilding and surface ship programs, including surface 
warfare education and training. Specifically, he sponsored the development, construction, 
and introduction of the AEGIS fleet of cruisers and destroyers and their associated combat 
systems. His responsibility also included a number of ongoing surface warfare programs: 
TOMAHAWK, Vertical Launch System, HARPOON, LAMPS, SQR-19 Towed Array, 
SQS-23 Sonar, MK-46 Torpedo, AEGIS Weapon System, New Threat Upgrade, 
Standard Missile, CIWS, RAM, NATO SEASPARROW, SLQ-32, Battle Group AAW, and 
Gas Turbine propulsion. 
Admiral Doyle was twice awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for exemplary service, 
first in international negotiations and then in surface warfare. He also holds two Legions of 
Merit and the Bronze Star. 
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On September 1, 1980, he retired after 34 years of commissioned service. Since then he 
has been advising the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory on various 
aspects of Anti-air Warfare and Fleet Air Defense. He is also associated with the National 
Defense Industrial Association as Vice Chairman of the Strike, Land Attack and Air 
Defense Committee. He serves on an Advisory Board at the U. S. Naval War College 
and is on the Board of Directors of the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of 
Virginia. From 1982 to 1989, he taught International Law of the Sea at the National Law 
Center, George Washington University. He also participated in revising the laws of naval 
warfare sponsored by the San Remo Institute of Humanitarian Law. 
Admiral Doyle is married to the former Jeannette Eleanor Blair of Berkeley, California. The 
Doyle’s have three children, Kathleen (Mrs. C. Michael Watson), James H. Ill, and Anne 
(Mrs. 1. Bruce Cauthen), and five granddaughters, Alice and Laura Watson, Katherine and 





Ralph E. Hawes, Jr. 
Ralph E. Hawes, Jr. is the Managing Principal of Hawes & Associates, a 
management consulting business, serving as a consultant and advisor to 
government agencies and aerospace/defense companies on technical, systems, 
and business related matters. 
Prior to this, he served as Executive Vice President - Missiles and 
Electronics of the General Dynamics Corporation until he retired on 
March 1, 1991. He was appointed to this position in January 1988, after serving 
since June 1985 as Vice President and General Manager of the company's 
Valley Systems Division as its chartering General Manager. 
Mr. Hawes joined the company's Pomona Division in California as an 
electronics engineer in 1956. He served in numerous technical and 
management positions related to advance system design, missile guidance 
system design, program development, and production for tactical missile and 
electronic systems. In these capacities he gained national recognition as a 
pioneer in the design, development, and production of tactical missiles 
using homing guidance techniques for their effectiveness. He holds 
technical patents on several systems. 
Mr. Hawes served as the Pomona Division Vice President, Research & 
Engineering from 1973-1 977. In 1977, he was appointed Vice President & 
General Manager at the Pomona Division. He was elected a Vice President of 
the Corporation in 1978. He served in the positions until being appointed 
chartering General Manager of the Valley Systems Division that he formed 
from the Pomona Division as a result of high internal growth of that 
division. 
On being appointed Executive Vice President - Missiles and Electronics, Mr. 
Hawes assumed senior management responsibility for four General Dynamics 
divisions with a combined revenue of nearly $2.5 billion, employing over 
20,000 employees. 
Prior to joining General Dynamics in 1956, Mr. Hawes was an electronics 
engineer with the Clarke H. Joy Company located in Bay Village, Ohio. 
Mr. Hawes' honors include receiving the Clarkson Golden Knight Award for 
professional accomplishment, the National Management Association (NMA) 
Silver King of Management Award in 1982, the NMA Golden Knight of 
Management Award in 1988, and the Boy Scouts of America "Good Scout" Award 
in 1982. 
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He has served as a member of the Board of the American Defense Preparedness 
Association, a Director of the Atlantic Council (Business Advisory Board), 
member of the Navy League, member of the Association of the United States 
Army, and a member of the Corporation of the Charles Stark Draper 
Laboratories. 
Mr. Hawes is a Trustee of Clarkson University, having served as Chairman, 
and served on the Board of Advisors of the Southern California School of 
Engineering; served on the Executive Board of the St. Louis Area Council, 
the Old Baldy Council, and the Occoneechee Council, Boy Scouts of America; 
served on the Arts and Education Council of Greater St. Louis; and was a 
member of the Galileo Society of Harvey Mudd College, the Los Angeles Fair 
Association, and the President's Council of the California State 
Polytechnic University at Pomona. 
Mr. Hawes was born December 27, 1930 in Covington, Louisiana. He received a 
BSEE from Clarkson University, Potsdam, New York in 1955 and his ME through 
the Engineering Executive Program from the University of California at Los 
Angeles in 1969. 
Mr. Hawes is married to Solita Anna Staack. They have three children and 




Dr. Kossiakoff is Chief Scientist of the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and 
member of the Laboratory’s Science and Technology Council. He is also Program Chair 
of the Master of Science in Systems Engineering and Master of Science in Technical 
Management programs for the Johns Hopkins University, G.W.C. Whiting School of 
Engineering. 
Dr. Kossiakoff is a graduate of the California Institute of Technology and received his PhD 
at Johns Hopkins. He served with the wartime Office of Scientific Research and 
Development in the development of solid rocket technology and was Deputy Director of 
Research at the Allegheny Ballistics Laboratory, Cumberland, Maryland from 1944 to 
1946. In recognition of his work on national defense during WWII and at APL, Dr. 
Kossiakoff was awarded the Presidential Certificate of Merit, the Navy’s Distinguished 
Public Service Award and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public 
Service. 
Dr. Kossiakoff jointed the Applied Physics Laboratory in 1946. He was appointed 
Assistant Director in 1948, and served as Director from 1969 to 1980. His technical 
contributions at APL have been principally in the systems engineering of guided missiles, 
automation of radar surveillance systems, and software engineering technology. He is co- 
author of the textbook on systems engineering used in the core courses of the JHU MS in 
Systems Engineering program. 
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Walter B. LaBerge 
Education: BA Naval Science, University of Notre Dame 1944 
BS Physics, University of Notre Dame 1947 
Ph.D. Physics, University of Notre Dame 1951 
Professional Experience: 
Current Visiting Professor, US Naval Postgraduate School 
Visiting Professor, Institute for Advanced Technology, U. of Texas 
1993-1 999 
1981 -1 989 
1979-1 980 
1 977-1 979 
1976-1 977 
1 973-1 976 
1971 -1 973 
1957-1 971 
1951 -1 957 
1981 
Senior Research Scientist, Institute for Advanced Technology 
Corporate VP, Lockheed Corp., Dir. LMSC Research Labs. 
Acting UnderSec R&D, Dept. of Defense 
Principal Dep. UnderSec R&D, Dept. of Defense 
Under Secretary of Army, US Army 
Assistant Secretary General, NATO 
Assistant Secretary, R&D, US Air Force 
Technical Director, ASTD, NOTS China Lake, CA 
VP, Div. GM and engineer, Philco-Ford Corp. 
Program Manager (SIDEWINDER), NOTS, China Lake, CA 
Awards: 
Member, National Academy of Engineering 






Army Science Board 
Introduction of SIDEWINDER into Navy, USAF 
Design and implementation USAF Ground Satellite net 
Design and improvement, NASA Mission Control Center, 
Houston 
Introduction of AWACS into NATO 
Chairman, 1989 seminal ASB Army Technology Review 
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Vice Admiral Paul Fenton McCarthy, US Navy (Retired) 
Paul McCarthy, current incumbent of the Admiral Peter C. Conrad Chair of Financial 
Management, Naval Postgraduate School, is a former Navy flag officer with significant 
leadership and management experience in both the military and industry. His disciplines 
include strategic planning, program management, engineering and financial management. 
Professional Experience: 
1997 to 2000: After the merger with the Boeing Company, Mr. McCarthy became the 
Director of Naval Systems Integration. This venture introduced Boeing to the naval 
weapons systems integration arena. In rapid succession, his office won three contracts: 
DD-21, the U. S. Navy's next generation surface combatant; Integrated Deep Water 
Systems, the restructuring of the U.S. Coast Guard force structure; and CVN-77/CVNX, 
the U.S. Navy's next generation carrier. Mr. McCarthy developed the strategy, teaming 
arrangement, and directed the proposal and contract efforts for these programs. He also 
was involved with BAe in the Royal Navy's CVF program, the United Kingdom's next 
generation carrier. The ultimate value of all these efforts is well over $70 billion. 
1992-1 996: Joining the McDonnell Douglas Company in January 1992 as Director, 
Engineering, he was sequentially promoted to Division Director, then Vice President 
Engineering, and, Vice President Systems Integration. Through out that time, he was 
responsible for instituting a number of streamlining and affordability measures involving 
processes, tools, training and the implementation of Integrated Product/Process 
Development. With the integration of these measures, savings of over 14% were 
achieved in the design, manufacturing and assembly of a number of programs highlighted 
by the F/A18E/F. 
1990-1 992: Prior to joining McDonnell Douglas, Mr. McCarthy was President of McCarthy 
and McCarthy, a consulting firm involving strategic planning, management, programmatics 
and technical areas. Clients included McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, Lockheed, 
Westinghouse, Texas Instruments, Alenia, and a number of other major corporations. 
1954-1 990: A career naval officer for over 35 years, Mr. McCarthy rose to the rank of Vice 
Admiral. His seven sea commands included squadron, air wing, carrier, task force and 
finally command of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet. His experience encompasses over 250 
combat missions, 850 carrier landings, as well as qualifications in Surface Warfare and 
Naval Aviation. 
During his time in Washington, Admiral McCarthy had three acquisition tours in the 
Pentagon on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. His first tour as a Commander, 
was in OP-96, analyzing a wide variety of programs for cost, schedule and technical risks. 
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Mr. McCarthy's second tour as a newly frocked Rear Admiral was OP-50 (N-880) with the 
budget responsibility for Naval Aviation of over $23 billion. This responsibility included 
shepherding programs through the Pentagon's Program, Planning and Budgeting Cycle, 
working with the Systems Commands, Navy Laboratories, and Test Centers. Daily 
interfaces included the staff of the Secretary of Defense, as well as Congressional 
members and staff. Strategic planning and budgeting were major focal areas. In his 
final acquisition tour, Vice Admiral McCarthy was the Director, Research, Development 
and Acquisition, OP-98, reporting to both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary 
of the Navy. This assignment included oversight of a $10 billion account of over 600 
programs which ultimately leveraged over $200 billion in production funds. This tour again 
involved interfaces with all the other services, military and commercial laboratories, as well 
as other government agencies and a broad spectrum of industry. 
Education: 
A native of Boston, Massachusetts, Mr. McCarthy holds a Bachelor's degree in Marine 
and Electrical Engineering from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy and a Master of 
Science degree in Management from the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School. He 
participated in post graduate studies in Engineering at the U.S. Navy Nuclear Power 
Facility, Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Honors: 
Doctorate of Public Administration, Massachusetts Maritime Academy 
Order of the Rising Sun, Japan 
National Service Medal, Korea 
Cross of Gallantry, South Vietnam 
Distinguished Service Medal, U.S. Navy 
Who's Who in America, 1982 
Who's Who in Aviation, 1983 
Members hips: 
Society of Experimental Test Pilots 
Trustee, Naval Institute Foundation 
Board of Visitors, Massachusetts Maritime Academy 
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Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, US Navy (Retired) 
Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, a native of Brunswick, Missouri, retired in 
1985 as the Deputy Commander for Weapons and Combat systems, Naval Sea 
Systems, Naval Sea Systems Command and Ordnance Officer of the Navy. His 
career began in 1943 as an apprentice seaman. He was commissioned Ensign, U.S. 
Naval Reserve, in 1946 and was transferred to Regular Navy in 1948. 
Rear Admiral Meyer graduated from the University of Kansas in 1946 as a 
B.S. in Electrical Engineering. He is also a B.S. in Electrical Engineering 
and a M.S. in Astronautics and Aeronautics from the MIT, and a B.S. in 
Electrical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School. 
His first sea duty in GOODRICH (DDR-831) was followed by sea tours in 
SPRINGFIELD (CL-66) and SIERRA (AD-18). From 1951 through 1955, he attended 
the Joint Guided Missile School, Fort Bliss, Texas, the Naval Line School, 
Monterey, California, and served as instructor at the Special (atomic) 
Weapons School, Norfolk, Virginia. He returned to sea as Executive Officer 
in STRICKLAND (DER-333) followed by service on the Staff, Commander, 
Destroyer Force, Atlantic. 
After Graduate School, Monterey, and MIT, he was ordered to the TALOS 
cruiser GALVESTON (CLG-3) as conversion Fire Control and subsequently 
Gunnery Officer. He then reported to Secretary of the Navy's Special Task 
Force for Surface Missile Systems (later Surface Missile Systems Project, 
Naval Material Command) in Washington, D.C. He transferred to the Naval 
Ordnance Engineering Corps in 1966. 
In 1967, he reported as Director of Engineering at the Naval Ship Missile 
Systems Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, California. In 1970, he reported 
to the Naval Ordnance Systems Command, as Manager, AEGIS Weapons System. He 
was named Project Manager (the final one) for Surface Missile Systems in 
1972 and in July 1974, he was named the first Director of Surface Warfare, 
Naval Sea Systems Command. 
He was selected for Admiral in January 1975. In July 1975, he assumed 
duties as the founding Project Manager, AEGIS Shipbuilding. In September 
1983, he was reassigned as Deputy Commander, Weapons and Combat Systems, 
Naval Sea Systems Command. 
Rear Admiral Meyer's personal decorations and service medals include: 
Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, 
Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation Ribbon with Bronze Star, China Service 
Medal, American Campaign Medal, World War II Victory Medal, Navy Occupation 
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Service Medal, National Defense Medal with Bronze Star, Armed Forces 
Expeditionary Medal, Vietnam Service Medal, and the Republic of Vietnam 
Gallantry Cross with Palm Unit Citation and Republic of Vietnam Civil 
Actions Unit Citation. He holds the American Society of Naval Engineers 
Gold Medal (1976), Silver Medal from the Old Crow Electronics 
Countermeasure Association and was recognized in 1981 by the University of 
Kansas with its Distinguished Engineer Alumni Award. He holds Naval 
Ordnance Engineer Certificate #99. He is a Fellow in the American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics and 1983 recipient of that Institute's 
Missile Systems Award for distinguished service. He was recipient of the 
Navy League's RADM William Parsons Award in 1985 for scientific and 
technical progress in construction of the nation's AEGIS fleet. In 1985, 
the American Society of Naval Engineers again recognized him with its 
Harold E. Sanders Award for a lifetime of contributions to Naval 
Engineering. In 1988, the National Security Industrial Association 
recognized him with its Admiral J. H. Sides Award for major contributions 
to Anti-Air Warfare. Again, in 1997 he was designated a Pioneer in the U.S. 
Navy's newly-created Acquisition Hall of Fame in the Pentagon. 
He is the son of Mr. and Mrs. Eugene Meyer (deceased) of Brunswick, 
Missouri. He is widower to the former Margaret Garvey of Dorchester, 
Massachusetts. He lives in Falls Church, Virginia and has three grown 
children and four grandchildren. 
Rear Admiral Meyer presently operates a consultancy with rooms in Crystal 
City, Virginia. His consultancy embraces both private and government clients in 
the fields of project management, system engineering and strategic 
planning. He chairs and serves on numerous Panels and Committees chartered 
by various DOD civil and military officials. He has served on the National 
Ballistic Missile Defense Advisory Committee for the past seven years, 
serving as its Chairman for the past three years. He also gives numerous 
speeches besides reviewing and editing articles, essays and books. 
37 








Defense Technical Information Center 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
Dudley Knox Library, Code 013 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-51 00 
VADM Dennis V. McGinn 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements 
and Programs, N7, OPNAV 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Room 4E536 
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000 
VADM Michael G. Mullen 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements 
and Assessments, N8, OPNAV 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Washing ton , D. C. 20350-2000 
RADM Rodney P. Rempt 
President 
Naval War College 
686 Cushing Rd. 
Newport, RI 02841 -501 0 
RADM Jay M. Cohen 
Chief of Naval Research/Director, Test and Evaluation and 
Technology Requirements, N091, OPNAV 
800 N. Quincy St. 
Ballston Towers 1 
Arlington, VA 2221 7-5660 
RADM Charles B. Young 
Vice Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
1333 Isaac Hull Ave., SE 
Washington Navy Yard 















RADM Michael G. Mathis 1 
Assistant Deputy Commander for Surface Ship Technology, SEA 
53, NAVSEASYSCOM/Commander, Naval Surface Warfare 
Center 
1333 Isaac Hull Ave., SE 
Stop 501 1 
Washington Navy Yard 
Washington, D.C. 20376-7001 
RADM Lewis W. Crenshaw Jr. 
Director, Assessment Division, N81, OPNAV 
2000 Navy Pentagon 
Room 5D644 
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000 
RADM Charles H. Johnston Jr. 
Vice Commander 
Naval Air Systems Command 
47123 Buse Rd., Unit #IPT 
Patuxent River, MD 20670-1 547 
VADM William H. Rowden, USN (Ret) 
55 Pinewood Court 
Lancaster, VA 22503 
RADM George H. Meinig, USN (Ret) 
120 Lamb Tavern Lane 
Glenmoore, PA 19343 
VADM J.T. Parker, USN (Ret) 
3061 Mimon Road 
Annapolis, MD 21403 
VADM James H. Doyle, USN (Ret) 
5121 Baltan Road 
Bethesda, MD 2081 6 
RADM Wayne E. Meyer, USN (Ret) 
President 
The W.E. Meyer Corporation 
2231 Crystal Drive, Suite 1005 


















RADM J.T. Hood, USN (Ret) 
Lockheed Martin NE&SS 
Mail Stop 108-1 08 
199 Borton Landing Road 
Moorestown, NJ 08057 
RADM Philip Dur, USN (Ret) 
Northrop-Grumman Ship Systems 
P.O. Box 149 
Pascagoula, MI 39568-01 49 
Mr. Tom Eubanks 
JHU/APL Room 6-152 
11 100 Johns Hopkins Road 
Laurel, MD 20723 
Mr. Jerry Lockard 
Raytheon Missile Systems 
Bldg. 807, MS J7 
P.O. Box 11337 
Tucson, AZ 85734-1 337 
Mr. R. W. Constantine 
Air Defense Systems Dept. 
JHU/APL 
11 100 Johns Hopkins Road 
Laurel, MD 20723 
Mr. William Cocimano 
2250 Wellington Woods Drive 
Waldorf, MD 20603 
Mr. Tom C. Pendergraft 
Executive Director 
NSWC/DD 
17320 Dahlgren Road 
Dahlgren, VA 22448-5100 
Mr. Ralph Hawes 
60 Braemar Road 
Fairwoods-on-Seven 




















Mr. Marion Oliver 
1251 0 Kenedo Circle 
Elbert, CO 80106 
Mr. Joe Threston 
1002 Cherry Lane 
Cinnaminson, NJ 08077 
MGEN Gene Fox, USA (Ret) 
181 1 Melbourne Dr. 
McLean, VA 22101 
CAPT Fritz Wendt, USN (Ret) 
30 Wood Hill Rd. 
Pittsford, NY 14534 
Mr. Jim Whalen 
Anteon, Inc. 
2231 Crystal Drive, Suite 1000 
Arlington, VA 22202-3742 
CAPT Jerry Nittle, USN (Ret) 
Anteon, Inc. 
2231 Crystal Drive, Suite 1000 
Arlington, VA 22202-3742 
CAPT A.J. Cetel, USN (Ret) 
Anteon, Inc. 
2231 Crystal Drive, Suite 1000 
Arlington, VA 22202-3742 
CAPT Chuck Vogan, USN (Ret) 
Anteon, Inc. 
2231 Crystal Drive, Suite 1000 
Arlington, VA 22202-3742 
Mr. Troy Kimmel 
Anteon, Inc. 
2231 Crystal Drive, Suite 1000 
Arlington, VA 22202-3742 
Dr. James Colvard 
1641 1 Ridge Road 






33. Dr. James Colvard 
1641 1 Ridge Road 
King George, VA 22485 
34. Mr. Robert Murray 
President 
Center for Naval Analyses 
4825 Mark Center Drive 
Alexandria, VA 2231 1-1 850 
35. Ms. Christine Fox 
Center for Naval Analyses 
4825 Mark Center Drive 
Alexandria, VA 2231 1-1 850 
36. Dr. Ralph Passarelli 
Center for Naval Analyses 
4825 Mark Center Drive 
Alexandria, VA 2231 1-1 850 
37. Dr. Fred Bomse 
Center for Naval Analyses 
4825 Mark Center Drive 
Alexandria, VA 2231 1-1 850 
38. Mr. Charles Giacchi 
Executive Director 
4363 Missile Way 
Point Hueneme Division 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4307 
39. Mr. Kenneth Boyd 
P.O. Box 177 
LaPlata, MD 20646 
40. Research Office, Code 09 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-51 38 
41. Institute for Defense Systems Engineering and Analysis 
Naval Postgraduate School 
777 Dyer Rd. 
Mail Code 97 
Monterey, CA 93943-51 00 
42 
1 
1 
108 
